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Ignacio De Leon 
Abstract
T
his paper contends that the identification of a
pro-competitive agenda in the process of
regulatory reform undertaken in many developing
countries, particularly in the field of utilities
regulation, ultimately rests on the vision held by
the authority about the sources of market failures.
Conventional Industrial Organization theory
assumes that the exercise of market power by
incumbent firms limits the access of potential
competitive entrants, and therefore, government
regulation should curb such power. However, the
existence of market “power” is an inference from
conventional “equilibrium” thinking on markets and
competition, where such power is associated with
the static conditions of markets, away from the
efficient equilibrium epitomized by the Perfect
Competition model. By logical inference, an
alternative “market process” view that regards
markets as entities subject to constant disequilibrium
should lead to alternative normative conclusions.
Under this alternative view, exploring the role of
rules and institutions is essential for the analysis of
“efficient” market outcomes. Such efficiency is
related to the capacity of market participants to
coordinate their productive activities, and
complementary entrepreneurial synergies. This
paper outlines an alternative network competition
perspective, focused on the integration of
complementary capabilities, as a regulatory
yardstick. This view balances the rights of incumbent
firms to exploit their rights, and the possibilities of
third parties to integrate into the network concerned
on a non-discriminatory basis, thereby preserving
the investments of incumbents on a more equitable
basis. It also explores the experience of selected
Latin American countries in the development of this
network competition approach.
JEL Classification: B21, B25, K21, L51
I. Introduction
In Latin America, most public services were provided
by public monopolies until the mid-1980s, in sectors
such as telecommunications, gas, water, electricity, and
transportation. However, since then, most countries
have undertaken institutional reforms to improve the
efficiency of the sector, to reduce public deficits, and
to increase consumer welfare.
The building blocks of these reforms were two-fold:













○improve the management of services, and reduce deficits,
and secondly, at a later stage, the increase of consumer
welfare through efficient regulation. Almost two decades after
the process began, the reforms succeeded in bringing private
participation to public utilities, but they did not succeed in
promoting effective competition. This situation occurred in
many instances due to the unqualified transfer of public assets
to private hands, without changing the monopoly legal
structure that governed the relationships between economic
agents before privatization took place. Many thought that
simply by changing from public into private ownership
incentives to undertake a better service would automatically
follow. Although significant improvements were achieved
in many cases, optimal performance would not necessarily
be warranted, as the experience would show.
In fact, during the initial stages of economic liberalization,
most Latin American countries showed a poor record of
competition in utilities. Several signals show the lack of
competition:
• Price distortions. As a result of this phenomenon, tariffs
are on average, higher in most countries of the region
than in other countries. This is most evident in the
telecommunication sector.
• The proliferation of state aids and subsidies to public
enterprises. This is very common in the case of power
distribution companies in Colombia, Brazil, and
Venezuela, and water supplying companies in Brazil.
• The proliferation of vertically integrated firms operating
in markets characterized by natural monopolies that often
undertake cross subsidies. This is especially common in
the electricity and water sectors. As a result of cross-
subsidies, industrial consumers subsidize residential
ones.
• The discrimination of customers.
• The impossibility for consumers to choose service
suppliers.
As a result of poor regulation and government fiat, high
concentration dominates Latin America´s industrial
landscape in utilities and infrastructure industries both
horizontally and vertically, thereby creating a synergy that
stimulates the lack of competition in these sectors. For
example, in the telecommunications sector, basic phone
services (e.g. fixed phone) are often controlled by one
company, simply because governments ensured legal
monopolies to the winning parties after the bidding for
privatization had taken place. Licenses for second operators
are a recent phenomenon, which has been prompted in many
cases by the force of public opinion. In Venezuela, for
instance, CANTV enjoyed a legal monopoly from 1992 till
1999. In Mexico, Telmex holds an uncontested legal
dominant position for the same reason, despite the increasing
concern of public opinion.
Governments are too keen to engage in privatization
processes, without much reflection on the regulatory
aftermath that should be in place to keep distorting incentives
at bay. As a result, they tend to maintain the same industrial
market structure that used to prevail before privatization. A
good example of this is the monopoly observed in the gas
production industry. In Argentina, for instance, YPF holds
around a fifty percent market share; Ecopetrol controls around
seventy percent in Colombia, and Mexico’s Pemex and
Venezuela’s Pedevesa control their entire markets. Curiously,
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Today, it is clear that competition principles should be part
of the body of utilities regulation. The question that arises
is, how should that concern be properly reflected in the body
of new regulations? In another work1 I have stated that
inefficient regulation in utilities stems from three different
sources: a. The dynamics of the institutional reform process;
b. The lack of effective competition policy, and, c. The lack
of coordination between regulatory institutions and
competition policy.  Some authors emphasize that changes
should be introduced into the set of rules governing the
regulator of the industry concerned, as too many synergies
were suspected to exist between regulatory agencies and
the political interests behind them. Governments used to
possess an undisclosed clout over these agencies, which
made these to be perceived by the business community as
mere instruments for accomplishing political, not economic
goals. Evidently, this perception was a defeating force against
anyone attempting to persuade new investors to come in to
participate on equal foot, as property rights were rightly
perceived to ultimately depend on the will of politicians,
not on the rule of law. Much emphasis has therefore been
placed on ensuring that objective, impartial, and professional
regulatory authorities are set in place.
Little has been said, however, about the more vexed problems
that a competition or regulatory authority, notwithstanding
its impartiality and good faith, would have to face from the
viewpoint of competition, to ensure a fair balance of private
interests in the sector regulated. In other words, assuming
these authorities are institutionally capable of doing a fair
assessment of the position of competing firms before them,
do they have predefined principles, and a transparent policy
making agenda to ensure that competition is preserved?
The purpose of this paper is to present some reflections over
the problem of the agenda that competition authorities have
to develop in order to ensure proper institutional conditions
for competition to develop in infrastructure services. Such
institutional conditions entail, above all, a definition of rights
between market participants of this industry. This paper
contends that the criteria drawn from conventional industrial
organization, which is used for qualifying the position of
these participants in the market, and render tautological
conclusions that provide no answer for the Authority to
decide whom should be given the right to operate and under
what conditions. These criteria emphasize the idea that
“access” to the market is foreclosed whenever “natural
monopolies” limit the possibilities for more than one firm to
participate in the market, and that such condition is lost
whenever technology innovation erodes the position of the
incumbent firm, to a position where she cannot challenge
other firms from entering the market. In our opinion, this
view of the problem leads to self-contained normative
prescriptions, because it places the possibilities of
institutional restructuring in the hands of factors above the
will of the regulator, namely, technological evolution;
indeed, it gives regulators an entire discretion in determining
whether an industry should be regarded as possessing
insufficient technological advance to erode the position of
incumbent firms presumably enjoying a “natural monopoly”.
In its stead, we propose an alternative “network perspective”
from which more meaningful conclusions could emerge about
who-should-be-allowed-to-do-what. This perspective does not
emphasise the idea of “accessing to a given market” but rather,
that of developing “complementary capabilities” thus enabling
the applicant party to connect to the network. The difference
between both perspectives lies on the balance of rights
allocated in each case: whereas in the conventional notion
the potential entrant always appear to be “the victim” of the
aggression exercised by a firm enjoying a “natural monopoly”,
in the case of the networks, it depends on whoever wants to
penetrate the market to develop the proper means of
connectivity, and therefore, the burden of evidencing
misconduct from the opposite party would be reversed.
Let us explore these concepts more in depth.
II. Competing views about the regulation
of utilities: The conventional market
power approach versus the network
Competition Perspective. Open Source
regulation as a yardstick criterion
How would policy makers conceive the regulation of
utilities? The selection of the regulatory agenda will ultimately
depend on the perception of the regulator about the nature
of markets and of the circumstances where she deems a
“failure” to exist. In this regard, it is possible to distinguish
two alternative views of regulation, which provide different
policy recommendations for policy makers to follow.
1. I. DE LEON. The Role of Competition Policy in the Regulation of
Infrastructure Industries: Some lessons from the Latin American
Experience, paper presented at the Seminar “Politicas de
Competencia en Servicios de Infraestructura”, Interamerican
Development Bank, 23-24 April 2001, Washington, D.C.
2. C. GOLDMAN and R. CORLEY. Competition Policy in High-Tech
Markets: A perspective for consideration by Developing Economies,
Paper presented at the Third Annual Latin American Roundtable on
Competition and Trade Policy, Coral Gables, Florida, 3 March 2000,
p. 5.
3. The Treasury, Ministry of Commerce (Ed.) “Regulation of access
to vertically-integrated Natural Monopolies: A discussion paper”,













○In the first place, the conventional “market structure” view
of industrial organization considers the following guidelines:
• Markets should be regulated where natural monopolies
exist.
• It is necessary to supervise the incumbent’s potential
or actual restrictive behavior. This includes, of course,
controlling the conduct of the incumbent firm that is
presumed to hold a natural monopoly. Supervision
covers the control of tariffs and business conditions, to
avoid the exploitation of consumers and the undue
exclusion of competitors. This is the gist of the so-called
“essential facilities” doctrine, under which regulation is
“justified”.
• It is also necessary to control market structure. In
particular, it is necessary to exercise supervision of
mergers and acquisitions, which may impair the chances
of accessing alternative suppliers, which will be
eliminated from the market as a result of these operations.
In the conventional analysis, competition authorities often
stress the importance of introducing what they regard as
“competition” principles for activities where free access to
all is essential for the success of everyone involved. This is
the case of the infrastructure sector. Competition in their
view amounts to imposing measures on the party regarded
to be infringing the law (the incumbent dominant firm) which
de facto restrains his capacity for undertaking whatever
business strategies he pleases to outdo his competitors. In a
somewhat strange way, his efforts to challenge his
competitors become curtailed by a predefined notion of
competition which has been arrived upon by theoretical
constructions. This is dangerous way of thinking, and yet, it
constitutes the heart of competition policy analysis as it has
been practiced since its origins in the Sherman Act.
This is a result of the emphasis that has been placed on the
idea of “market power,” particularly while the market is in
the initial stages of its development. This is clearly evident
in the special focus placed on price considerations as the
expression of such “Power.” Although the notion of market
power also refers to the ability of firms to influence quality,
variety, servicing, advertising, or innovation, “it is usually
assessed primarily in terms of the parties’ ability to set prices
above competitive levels for a sustained period of time”2.
The involvement of competition agencies is becoming
widespread, and has encompassed activities such as airport
systems, railway transportation, water supply, and public
roads. Will privatization ensure that they will support
themselves without public financing? Will market structures
provide fair access to all, in downstream industries? Indeed,
frequently these industries possess the features of a natural
monopoly, thus deserving special regulation.
In this perspective, ensuring access to these sectors is
essential, particularly to downstream industries where
competition would be stalled if no access were available at
the upstream level of the infrastructure network. It is
necessary to focus on increasing access to markets for all
firms and consumers, with special attention given to
newcomers and firms with no market power. Special
attention is necessary to give effective access to required
inputs (information, technology, and competitively priced
materials).
In transition economies, productive entrepreneurship could
be affected if anti-competitive business behavior or
government barriers are erected, thus foreclosing the access
to services or information provided by access to an
infrastructure network.
This is especially important in vertically integrated industries.
In these cases the Baumol-Willig (BW) rule and other
interconnection pricing rules will be evaluated on the basis
of how well they contribute to overall economic efficiency.
Essentially, the BW rule states that a firm seeking access
should pay the incumbent a sum sufficient to compensate it
for the opportunity cost of customers lost to the entrant
including its foregone profits, if any. Hence the BW access
price may include the monopoly profit that the incumbent
loses by selling access in place of retail services3.
Finally, scholars and policy makers often refer to the need
of preserving an “open source” to incumbent firms asking
for a right of way into the respective facility.  In this way,
they reproduced the old market access approach of antitrust
policy, in a novel fashion.
III. The limits of the conventional market
access view of Open Source
The conventional “access” view of Open Source does not
conveys a faithful picture of the market relationships faced
by entrepreneurs, since it places the emphasis of the analysis
on the contention of firms fighting for scarce resources, thus
ignoring important elements of the picture that should not
be omitted, even though they may not appear so evident at
first sight.
Viewing the problem as one of allowing –or denying access
(“open source”) to certain firms regarded as potential entrants,
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solving the vexing problem of whether the contested resource
is sufficient for the two sides to enjoy. This is not the real
problem that should be in the mind of any government
authority interested in promoting competition, but rather is
the problem faced by a regulator deciding on distributive
grounds how much entitlement each side “deserves” over
the contested resource. This view was clearly stated by the
US Supreme Court of Justice, who concluded that the goals
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act were not to create a
market of resellers or to turn existing telephone networks
into a permanently shared resource. Supreme Court Justice
Breyer would emphatically put it in these terms:
“It is in the unshared, not in the shared, portions of the
enterprise that meaningful competition would likely
emerge”4 (Emphasis is the author’s).
Yet, regulators almost unanimously think they are promoting
competition by determining whether one competing firm
should be given access to a resource that is already in the
hands of another firm, or whether the latter should hold
exclusive rights on the resource, since there are other existing
facilities that could be used.
This conventional way of thinking the regulatory questions
follows the logic of the neoclassical competition analysis.
The conventional “access” view is forced to see the position
of firms in the market as a contending one, in which the
extent of individual rights of the incumbent firm is always
bound to limit the possibilities of the potential entrant firm.
This is so, because of the implicit normative deduction
resulting from the positive analysis of markets under
neoclassical terms. The neoclassical analysis is based on two
related premises:
First, under this view, the use of social resources is limited
by their alleged scarcity. Consequently, the role of regulatory
intervention is to determine what party should be allowed
to use such resources, and to what extent. Evidently, in the
context of a world with scarce resources it is impossible to
draw a different normative conclusion, except that the use
of social resources by one firm excludes the other. In case of
conflict between two sides, social welfare enhancing
measures should be imposed on both parties to “organize”
their access to the limited scarce social resource by way of
intervention. Clearly, neither party enjoys full property rights
over the social resource concerned, as government
intervention pursuant to achieve social goals could always
limit such rights.
A second related premise follows from the first assumption
of rights allocation under conditions of scarcity, namely, that
governments can acquire the necessary informational tools
enabling them to determine the extent to which one party
should surrender her entitlement over the resource to
another. In other words, the neoclassical view is assumed to
possess the proper means for establishing the instances in
which one party should be regarded “guilty” of breaching
competition rules, and that it would be possible to determine
the extent to which her right should be construed.
This view stems from the conventional neoclassical
assumptions according to which resources are scarce and
knowledge is available and plentiful. Reality, however,
dictates exactly the opposite.
In the first place, assuming that the facilities over which the
authority has to allocate rights are scarce, it is inaccurate, to
say the least. However, the dynamics of competition does
not itself limit to the rivalry of existing facilities, but in general,
facilities that could be built and those that have already been
built. This is so, because the incumbent firm is in fact pressed
hard by the possibility that new networks displacing that on
which he holds control through his entitlement on the
physical facility concerned.
A pro-competitive authority would not consider the problem
of access on to the physical facility as one that would
determine the fate of competition. Assuming no contrived
legal restraints on entry, competition is present at all times,
both at the time of entry into the facility (DEMSETZ, 1968) as
well as during the time when the facility is run by the
incumbent firm. Instead, a pro-competitive authority would
be concerned about developing networks that serve the
connectivity of anyone interested in connecting to a network,
either the existing one, or any other that could be developed
in case that the incumbent decides not to allow anyone else
to use his facility. As the case of Apple computers shows,
there is always a risk for the incumbent firm to develop
stringent access policies, which in the end could result in
the impairment of his own standard, and eventual
replacement by a more compatible competitor –i.e.
Microsoft.
Thus, the problem of the Authority is not to sacrifice one
right against another for the use of a given social resource; it
is to determine the best possible arrangement enabling both
parties –incumbent as well as potential competitor, to
develop their “connectivity”, both between them, as well as
with their clients and consumers, and let the market decide
which network has acquired more value, and therefore
should be preferred. 4. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd. 525 U.S. 366,429 (1999).Consequently, the conventional market access (open source)
standard also places competition authorities into a quagmire:
how should access be decided, not by reference of
competitive but distributive standards. Here lies an
insurmountable problem for the regulator to solve, under
the conventional view, because it is intrinsically impossible
to make a clear-cut determination of where and how property
rights should be allocated, due to the kind of knowledge
possessed by the Authority to make such determination. At
least, it is a problem that cannot be solved on efficiency
grounds, as they claim.
Generally, nevertheless, competition authorities strive
themselves to find a criterion by determining whether the
incumbent firm denying access to a potential competitor into
the facility is dominant or not. In the affirmative, they assume
that the negative represents a case of “abuse” of dominance
which should be sanctioned, by imposing a fine, and of
course, by letting the potential competitor to join the –so
declared, joint facility.
The informational limitations of competition authorities to
make this determination are quite obvious. Let us review
the way conventional market analysis proceeds, to
understand why.
In order to answer this question, neoclassical analysis proceeds
by establishing whether the suspected infringing party
possesses sufficient “market power” enabling her to impose
conditions unilaterally on the rest of competitors and clients.
In general, it is assumed that the more concentrated the market
is found to be, the more likely that the investigated firm will
be held liable, since all her market activity will be construed
as a contrived plan to displace and exclude potential or actual
competitors due to her “monopolistic intentions” –which will
be assumed to exist, again, due to the concentration of the
market in which the suspected firm operates.
Fortunately, Baumol’s Contestability theory tamed the
excesses of the conventional view. Under this theory, the
actual existence of a single firm operating in the market
should not lead the analyst into the conclusion that “market
power” would accrue per se. Market competition would
flourish, independently of the number of market participants
(or indeed, of any other structural consideration), as long as
entry barriers are low. For policy-making purposes, the stress
would no longer be made on deriving conclusions from the
level of concentration itself, to ascertain the degree of
competition in a given market, but to check on the level of
entry barriers.
But still, subjecting the existence of market power to an
indeterminate number of indicia, which give the analyst the
conviction that the dominant firm in the market did have
the single capacity of abusing its position, by dictating to
everyone else in the market here own conditions unilaterally,
stems from an assumption that cannot be documented or
evidenced as a legal case would require. These indicia are
among others, the size of the market in which market power
is suspected to exist, the existence of potential or actual rivals,
etc. All these elements, record the past condition of the
investigated firm, and thus, cannot be assumed to bear effects
into the competitive future of the firms involved.
Consider for one moment the position of those alleged
“victims” of the firm allegedly enjoying market power. Notice
that this logic assumes that these firms are unduly constrained
in their activity by what the one enjoying market power does
to influence them. They are assumed to be, as it were, totally
helpless to react against the “power” which “excludes” them
from the market. In reality, however, the fact that the
excluded party cannot overturn his fate is certainly not due
to his idleness, or to the fact that she is legally constrained
to react in order to outdo the apparently more “powerful”
party. If idleness or a lesser entrepreneurial capacity was the
reason for exclusion, then it is well deserved. If the source
of exclusion is some legal rule, then market power cannot
be blamed; instead, the legal rule should be overturned. What
facts do show is that the firm interested to enter into the
market is incapable of developing alternative business
strategies or more enticing products or services to lure
consumers into buying their own products, rather than those
of the “dominant” firm. In the absence of any external forces,
why should it be assumed that exclusion is the product of
some contrived manipulation on the side of the party
succeeding in the exclusion? The explanation for the
exclusion may be simpler: a less efficient competitor cannot
outdo a more efficient one in the preference of consumers.
The factual value of the elements considered in the market
power analysis is entirely contingent to the economic theory
embraced by the analyst. It is this economic theory which
determines how market causalities between these elements
should be construed, thereby pointing to a particular “fact”,
and consequently, to a given normative solution: either the
firm has “market power” or lacks of it.
Yet, comparing the nature of cases examined under the
“market power” conventional view with that of cases
involving conflicting entitlements, is misleading. In the latter,
there is confusion about the facts on which either party bases
its claim, and the purpose of the judge is to ascertain those
facts. A tenant may disagree with her landlord over the
interpretation of a given contractual clause, but in the end,
there is only one possible interpretation, as there is only
one factual reality over which interpretation of the contractual
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clause can be referred to. Either payment was effected or
not; either major damage was caused to the flat or not, etc.
In the case of conventional market power analysis, however,
facts are construed on the basis of economic hypotheses,
which render different alternative interpretations about
market causalities, and such hypotheses are contingent on
the personal views of the analyst.
As a consequence, the conventional analysis drives the
analyst to take sides in the controversy, judging ex-post
“facto” the rights of market participants without possessing
hard evidence for it, and concluding, by way of mere
speculation that concentration seals the fate of competition.
The analyst will be inclined to disregard the position of the
incumbent firm, which is also part of the social welfare
equation, particularly if this one is operating alone in the
market.
Due to its one-sidedness, the notion of “access” does not
convey the necessary informational tools for regulators to
decide whenever it is right to force incumbents to accept
the presence of a third party.
Even more importantly, the informational tools demanded
by this logic are impossible to satisfy due to the very nature
of the analysis requested upon the analyst. Thus, in order to
ascertain the “market power” of a given incumbent firm,
one has to compare the position of the incumbent with that
of an imaginary firm placed under a “perfect competition”
setting. Clearly, there is a sophism implicit in such
comparison, namely, that the “im-perfect” condition of the
incumbent should have led her into a different –presumably,
less anti-competitive, course of action. In reality, the existence
of one firm in the market may be the consequence of nothing
else but a set of institutional arrangements (better
coordination of the incumbent with consumers vis-à-vis its
potential competitors, less entrepreneurial competitors, high
transaction costs enabling the permanence of a single firm
in the market, etc.), that have nothing to do with the
incumbent entrepreneur, except his better capacity to be
more … competitive!
Yet, regulators are too much inclined to lean on this
perfection as a normative yardstick. Interpreting the 1996
Telecommunications Act in the United States, the Federal
Communications Commission used a cost-based standard
for “unbundled network elements” which ignored the
historical costs incurred into by the incumbent firms. The
standard, known as “Total Element Long Run Incremental
cost” or “TELRIC” sets prices to be charged by incumbents to
its competitors on the basis of only the incremental, forward-
looking cost of an entirely hypothetical, ideally efficient, state-
of-the-art network. As a result, TELRIC ignores historical costs
that incumbents incurred in constructing their networks, even
when the incumbents have yet to recover those costs through
their regulated rates. It also ignores the actual incremental,
or “forward-looking,” costs that an incumbent will occur in
improving or expanding its network. Unsurprisingly, the
TELRIC methodology has produced prices well below even
actual forward-looking costs that incumbents incur. As a
result, innovations and the construction of other networks
has been discouraged by such decision. In this connection,
Alfred Kahn’s disapproval of this methodology it is
particularly enlightening5.
Finally, the BW rule has done much to correct the excesses
of the more orthodox neoclassical market access approach,
by aligning the incentives of the potential entrant with those
of the incumbent firm through a given access price which
reflects the foregone profits lost by the incumbent as a result
of letting the competitor joining into the facility controlled
by the former. The only limitation of the rule is that it assumes
the information of the incumbent and entrant regarding an
optimal price, which is impossible to know in the medium
and long run, in the light of the emergence of competing
networks. The BW rule can only work reasonably well in
short term scenarios, which are unlikely to exist in this field,
due to the long term investment commitment of the
entrepreneur who invests in the development of utilities.
IV. Network competition view of Open
Source as a regulatory yardstick criterion
Surely, picturing a world of scarce resources, where
information is plentiful, and assuming that real firms should
behave like firms in an imaginary world of perfect
competition, does not correspond to a fair examination of
the realities of our complex world. In this world, firms and
entrepreneurs are placed in a position where they always
can look into new ways to lure consumers into buying their
products, at the expense of those who, at one point of time,
happens to hold a predominant position in the market.
In order to overcome the limitations of the conventional view,
we assume that firms in the market seek to collaborate as
much to compete, in order to discover new products and
innovations. The “network” approach emphasizes the
Kirznerian6 dynamic nature of competition that characterizes
these industries, where the position of one firm may
simultaneously be that of a competitor and a partner. The
implications of this perspective are also amenable with the
theoretical perspective presented above, which emphasizes
the integration of scattered knowledge through a better co-
ordination, hence the role of improving the connection of













○The network approach does not assume that one party profits
at the expense of another, but rather, that cooperation is
maximized whenever they are free to undertake their
preferred course of action. Sometimes this course of action
will “exclude” some economic agents, but this will be offset
by the enhanced cooperation that is achieved with other
parts of the economic system. For instance, whenever a
competitor displaces another it is because he is able to
summon the willingness of consumers around his product,
rather than that of his competitor. Cooperation between
consumers and the winning producer is thereby enhanced.
In the case of utilities, the use of a network may require that
some parties be excluded to preserve the enhanced quality
of the service provided.
Related to this, the new perspective focuses on the
competition that occurs between new innovations, systems
and standards that are valuable to consumers, rather than
on the individualistic view of isolated entrepreneurs outdoing
one another. The development of such systems and standards
may conflict with the traditional antitrust principles regulating
horizontal and vertical business behavior, which is
concentrated on the competiti6n that occurs between existing
products. Strategies such as horizontal co-ordination, joint
ventures, price discrimination, tie-in arrangements, and
pricing below cost may prove efficient under the analytical
principles underpinning “network competition”.
Network competition, by contrast, highlights the conditions
of efficiency that should predominate in the network to
function adequately, with no preference for the position of
either the incumbent or entrant firms. Therefore, it calls the
attention of competition authorities to focus on research,
development, and innovation as the primary measure of
whether such networks are competitive. In the area of public
services, the network condition of these industries is
compounded with the existence of multiple structures at
different levels of trade. In addition, the pre-eminence of
multi-product firms that enjoy a considerable degree of
vertical integration with activities characterized as natural
monopolies presents regulators important challenges for the
task of ensuring a competitive environment at all levels of
the industry concerned.
In this perspective, it is interesting to note the emergence of
the so-called “open source” regulation. Due to the dynamism
that characterizes certain industries (particularly those with
important high-tech components), regulators should ensure
that incumbent firms do not distort the entry of new firms by
innovating on the industry standards that turns future entry
impossible for further entrants. “Open-code rests upon a
license -upon a kind of law or regulation that controls how
this open code can be used. Despite the monikers “free”
and “open” this license is not forgiving. It is a fairly strict
requirement about the uses to which free or open source
technology can be put [...] The open-code movement thus
uses law to keep code open. It grants people access to code
on the condition that they pass the code along as
unencumbered as they received it. (In practical terms) the
law in open code means that no actor can gain ultimate
control over open-source code”7.
In policy terms, the network condition highlights important
problems that regulators must take into account.
• Private property on the network developed by the
private entrepreneur. This rule should be preserved
always, as acting in any other way would unavoidably
lessen the expectations of private entrepreneurs
(incumbents and potential developers of parallel
networks) about the integrity of their investments, thus
discouraging them. Non-discrimination should be the
only qualifying principle, as stated below.
• Fair opportunity of interconnection to the network. In
sectors regarded as “infrastructure networks” it is crucial
to ensure that the incumbent firm gives the new entrant
non-discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other competitors.
The connection of any competitor at the upstream or
downstream level is vital for promoting competition at
these levels.
• Open source access of common areas. Only
exceptionally, the law may declare some transit areas as
“common or public goods,” thus open for all to access.
Therefore, even though the law should acknowledge
exclusive rights to a holder of a physical resource of an
essential input in the production process undertaken by
other entrepreneurs at the upstream or downstream level,
the law could prohibit any measures clearly addressed
to impede the “connection” of a potential competitor.
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5. In the U.S. Alfred Kahn is widely acknowledged as the “father” of
deregulation in the airline industry in the 1970’s. In regards with his
criticism on the regulation process on the telecom industry, see his
presentation, “Telecom Deregulation: The Abominable TELRIC-BS”
presented at the Manhattan Institute [www.manhattan-institute.org/
html/kahn.htm] Also, a through work in this area is found at J. THORNE.
The 1996 Telecom Act: What went Wrong and Protecting the
Broadband Build out Columbia University Conference, “The
Broadband Economy”, New York, 2001.
6. It was ISRAEL KIRZNER who emphasized the dynamic essence of
market competition, and systematized through a rigorous analytical
framework. See I. KIRZNER. Competition and Entrepreneurship,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973.
7. L. LESSIG. “Innovation, regulation and the Internet”, The American
Prospect, March 27-April 10, 2000, p. 27.   
This rule, however, should be reserved to those cases
where the physical facility was built on public funds,
and was later privatized in private hands. Evidently, in
other cases, it is not possible to make such a qualification,
except in the case where the regulator can determine
objectively an intention to exclude the potential
competitor on pure competitive grounds. The difficulties
of finding such a case, in the light of what has been said
above, should be borne in mind.
• Preservation of the network quality. In cases where
free access is legally enforced, the law must determine
who will be responsible for preserving the standards of
the network, as excessive use of the network may impair
its quality.
• The elimination of cross-subsidies between vertically
integrated firms, which may exclude competitors at the
downstream or upstream market, may be a solution, but
due care must be exercised in avoiding the vertical
disintegration of firms, as a radical separation could
endanger the efficiency of the industry as a whole.
Evidently, the selection of either set of principles will depend
on the particular view held by the policy maker about the
nature of markets and of economic causalities. The dilemma
faced by regulators in the area of utilities will be the same.
In essence, the need to balance the difficulties of regulating
natural monopolies, except through ex-ante requirements,
charges regulators with the difficult decision of giving up
long-term investments, which would result from furthering
integration between all related activities in the industry, for
the sake of preserving short-term alternatives to consumers,
in the sense of ensuring access to not-so-efficient competitor
firms.
As a general rule, the use of (intellectual and ordinary)
property rights could prevent others from developing their
full capacity, if these rights are given undue excessive
protection in areas considered essential for all to access. The
regulator should exercise particular care in defining the
instances where the institutional conditions for limiting the
access of third parties are in place. However, this is a
determination that does not depend on the number of firms
existing in the market. Rather, it depends on the speed with
which new technologies, superseding prevailing standards,
may develop new competing standards.
Of course, it will be necessary for the regulator to inspect
and evaluate the industry concerned, and determine whether
there are technological reasons suggesting such an evolution.
For all these reasons, the complex nature of the technical
information that characterizes some economic sectors (i.e.
telecommunications, electricity, financial services, etc.)
demands the creation of expert regulatory commissions
representing the interests of all parties involved (consumers,
government, private businesses). The rationale for regulation
in these sectors is progressively linked to the practical
problems of managing the complexity of technical
information for the benefit of all the actors involved, thus
joining the more conventional justification based on the
notion of natural monopoly markets created by alleged
economies of scale. The goal of regulatory reform is to
identify which scheme best serves these purposes.
V. The Latin American experience
in the regulation of public utilities
and infrastructure
In light of the principles outlined above, we review some
selected experiences of infrastructure regulation where Latin
American competition agencies have been involved.
A. Electricity Sector
The need of incorporating competition principles in high
technology sectors such as electricity and telecommunica-
tions is present among Latin America competition agencies.
These sectors have undergone important changes in many
countries in the region, such as Guatemala, Venezuela,
Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. Introducing competition
principles for the definition of the regulatory framework of
these sectors is necessary, as they facilitate the process of
business adaptation taking place in the context of high
technological standards and the quick pace of technological
change, while ensuring the fairness of the access conditions
to such facilities. The high technological requirements
prevailing in these sectors, makes them prone to become
“natural monopolies”, due to the considerable costs involved
in the service. HENCE, adequate design of pro-competitive
regulation becomes essential for ensuring that the incentives
of operators and governments will be consistent with the
promotion of social welfare.
In these markets there are two crucial questions that
regulation must deal with. The first question is about
choosing the methodology to assess the prices to be charged
for the service. This price must consider both the high
technological demands of the service and the high sunk costs
involved in building the network, which is too bur4ensome
for numerous potential entrants to actually penetrate the
market and tends to create the conditions of natural
monopolies. Under these conditions, it may be difficult to













○surveillance may be necessary to set administered pricing8
in such a way as to simulate the effects of a competitive
market9.
Therefore, adequate regulation must discern the areas
susceptible to competition, and foster a climate where
competition can operate. Regulators must identify the lines of
service where competition can be created, and those where
natural monopolies prevail due to the existence of economies
of scale. Electricity generation and gas production, for example,
are sectors susceptible to competition, while electricity
transmission and gas distribution grids can be natural
monopolies, since for a certain size market a single distribution
grid can be more efficient than competing, duplicative, or
overlapping grids.
Besides setting prices, the definition of the conditions for
accessing the network is necessary. Given that the existence
of a natural monopoly gives market power to the operator
of the utility, it is necessary to ensure that this power will
not be misused by excluding potential upstream or
downstream competitors whose access to the network is
necessary. We have already examined the general rules
applicable to infrastructure networking access. These rules
may also be applicable by analogy to regulate the access to
the utility service at the stage of defining the regulatory
framework itself. Therefore, antitrust actions may be limited
by establishing ex-ante conditions regulating the conduct of
the operator, in its dealings with clients accessing the service
before trouble arises.
Often, the laws regulating these sectors refer to the need for
avoiding excessive concentration at levels where competition
is possible. For example, in the Peruvian Supreme Decree
27-95 ITINCI of 19 October 1995, it is prohibited for firms
enjoying a concession to operate the network (generation,
distribution, or transmission of electricity) to be partners of
other firms dedicated to the same activity.
By contrast, in Chile, the ChRC dismissed a petition to divest
a dominant conglomerate in the sector, Enersis, an enterprise
that integrated vertically power generation, transmission, and
distribution10. However, the Commission also issued some
guidelines for enhancing competition in this sector. First,
the authority should pass a regulation to eliminate some
loopholes in this market. Second, the company engaged in
the transmission business, Transelec, should own its assets
rather than just have their tenancy. Finally, distribution
companies should offer energy through bids in order to
enhance transparency and avoid discrimination.
Regulators must
identify the lines of
service where
competition can be
created  and those
where natural
monopolies prevail
due to the existence
of economies of
scale 
8. Administered pricing is used in this work as a term to refer to the
act of setting prices for goods and services by economic entities
who hold market power, or by extra-market forces (such as
regulators). “Administered pricing does not occur in a competitive
market, where no one entity can have influence on market prices.
Administered pricing, unlike prices, can be set at a fixed and specific
level, and can be set without regard, at least initially, to supply and
demand”. See Utility Pricing and Access: Competition for
Monopolies, OECD, Paris, 1991, p. 13. This report provides a good
summary of the conditions that characterize the nature of utility
market power and the alternatives for adequate pricing through the
creation or simulation of competitive market forces; also, it considers
the question of access to monopoly facilities.
9. Under such competitive market conditions, prices would have to
be a direct reflection of the least cost means of providing a service
to a given market, including proper internalization of appropriate
external costs; also they would impose risk on economic decision-
makers with the most control over cost; and they would have to be
flexible, to meet changing market conditions. Utility Pricing and
Access..., p. 16.
10. Resolution 488 of 11 June 1997.
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B. Gas Industry
In the mid-1990s the first natural gas pipe between Argentina
and Chile was set up. The ChRC issued proposals to ensure
that the transportation and distribution of gas was conducted
under competitive conditions. The Commission limited the
concentration of cross-shareholding among the corporations
engaged in transportation, distribution and big customers to
fifteen percent, to avoid their individual control of upstream
or downstream companies. Similar caveats were made in
the energy sector, and particularly in the electricity market.
Also, a fifteen percent cross shareholding cap was provided
between distributors in different geographic areas to avoid
horizontal integration. Further, it provided that a gas
concession should not be granted on an exclusive basis.
Finally, in regards to network access, it requires the operator
to facilitate the interconnection among the different networks
in a given area to avoid locking customers to a particular
supplier. As for the supply itself, it should be offered under
public, non-discriminatory conditions and it proposes to vest
the Commission with powers to regulate and set up prices.
In Panama, the Commission prepared a study about an
assessment of Competition in the Panamanian Fuel
Distribution Industry. The objective of this study is to assess
the level of competition existing in Panama’s fuel distribution
industry, based on observed prices and volumes directly
transacted in the market between 1993 and 1997. On a scale
from 0 (perfect competition) to I (collusion), the study
estimates he level of competition at 0.3, which suggests that
the industry was relatively competitive.
In Mexico, the Federal Competition Commission’s (CFCM has
also negotiated the conditions for introducing competition
in the gasoline distribution. This sector was in the hands of
Pernex, the Mexican state oil company, until recently. Today,
Pernex retains legal monopoly rights over oil exploitation,
but no longer has similar rights in the downstream industries,
consisting of gasoline distribution and sale.
The Commission studied the gasoline market and found that
there were less than four thousand station sellers in the whole
country, that the geographic distribution of gasoline stations
was uneven, and that few gasoline stations had very
important market segments. Service quality was low, and
there were no rules to open new gas stations. Also, there
were many artificial barriers to marketing complementary
goods and services, such as good and beverages, inside
gasoline stations.
In order to modernize the sector, the competition
Commission negotiated with Pernex for precise criteria for
the establishment of contracts between Pernex-Refinacion
and those individuals interested in operating gasoline service
stations. In June 1993, they signed a consent agreement
setting forth the necessary conditions to meet consumer
demands more efficiently. In this agreement, they agreed to
the following:
a. Set clear, simple requirements for application and
acquisition of contracts to operate new gasoline stations;
b. Establish a commitment on the side of Pemex
Refinacion to enter into contracts with anyone interested
in opening new gasoline stations, provided that they meet
certain technical, safety, environmental and image
specifications;
c. Eliminate restrictions on the number f gasoline stations
that can be opened in a specific area and any distance
requirements that may have existed in the past between
stations;
d. Establish that supply contracts between Pemex-
Refinacion and third parties may be freely traded in a
secondary market provided that the former is duly
notified; and
e. Eliminate the sub-franchising system, thus allowing),
the marketing of all goods and services in gasoline
stations, other than prohibited products, such as alcohol
or explosives.
These guidelines were later published in a “Simplified
Program to Establish New Gasoline Stations”11. It is expected
that these principles will introduce competition, in several
ways. First, by providing the incentives to increase the
number of gas stations, consumers will bear lower costs either
because waiting times at stations will decrease, or because
distances between stations will shorten. Second, the service
quality will improve; widening the range of goods which
consumers will be able to buy. Third, there will be new
opportunities open for those interested in opening up new
gasoline stations. All this will enable increased price
liberalization in this market.
C. Telecommunications
The interface between regulators and competition authorities
is particularly intense in the telecommunications sector.
During the last decade the telecommunications sector in the
region underwent two major breakthroughs, the long
distance multi-carrier crashing the monopoly enjoyed by
former state-owned firms operating the sector, and the setting
up of the mobile telecommunications system. Often,
competition authorities in the region have provided advice
to telecom regulators on the way by which the process of
liberalisation should be carried out.In Mexico, privatizations and license auctions form a
substantial body of the CFCM involvement in teleco-
mmunications. The criteria applied by the Commission to
approve the participation of potential bidders are very similar
to those applied in merger review. Given the scarcity of the
radio electric spectrum, this resource becomes an essential
input in the generation of several telecommunications
services, particularly of fixed wireless telephones. It is
important that its allocation be assigned according to
competitive principles.
In this connection, the Commission must approve those
companies willing to participate in the spectrum auctions.
In this decision, the Commission must consider the relevant
market(s) affected by the auction, the characteristics of the
applicant companies, and the efficiencies of their acquiring
the auctions frequencies. In addition, the Commission must
establish the maximum amounts of radio-spectrum
frequencies to be acquired by each company in an auction.
For this purpose, the commission carries out an analysis of
concentration indexes similar to those applicable in merger
cases.
in fact, the Mexican case show how important is for
competition authorities to get involved in the regulation of
utilities in network industries. In 1990 the Government
privatized Telmex, the Mexican telecommunications
monopoly. Telmex’ concession title granted this company a
legal monopoly over long-distance phone services. Several
years after privatization, the development of this company
has been limited, and even though there has been an
expansion in the service provided, there still is a large
unsatisfied demand. The quality of the services and the
inability of the company to repair failures in the system have
prompted numerous complaints from customers. Similarly,
the company offers few products and costs are high.
In order to improve the status quo, CFCM investigated the
sector and concluded that the opening to competition was
the best course of action to meet the objectives of enhanced
efficiency and economic growth. In order to design the
opening process, the Commission, together with the
corresponding regulating authority and the Ministry of
Communication and Transportation, has provided an
important consulting role within the Government.
In essence, the CFCM reviewed the regulatory framework
taking into account the experiences of Australia, the United
States, New Zealand, Japan, and the United Kingdom. It also
evaluated the proposal for opening the sector presented by
Telmex. The Commission concluded that:
1. The number of competitors, either for basic phone
services (long distance and local communication) should
not be limited; and that Telmex should allow in time
interconnection between competing companies in every
technically feasible point and not only in a restricted
group of them. In other words, it should allow every
route to be open to competition.
2. Competing companies must be able to decide whether
or not to interconnect to Telmex’s network. By protecting
this liberty, the CFCM intended to promote investment
and infrastructure development. In addition, it allows
the existence of medium-term, self-regulating
interconnection tariffs, reducing the need for tariff control
from the authority.
3. Companies should be able to compete in national
and international long distance services, thus avoiding
the existence of exclusivity agreements, which give a
captive market to certain companies, thereby excluding
potential entrants.
4. The new regulations must offer fair conditions to every
competitor, regardless of its size. Interconnection charges
should be the same for everyone. For this reason, it is
essential to ensure the transparency of interconnection
costs. Users must be able to subscribe to a company in
order for them to be able to discriminate between quality
and price of several competitors. Access must be gained
through dialing the minimum number of digits, and
companies should offer complementary services to users,
such as operator or invoicing adapted to the clients’
needs.
5. In order to avoid the creation of barriers to the entry
of potential competitors, concessions and authorizations
must be granted to all interested parties, mainly on the
basis of technical considerations, which minimize
discretionary margins, and concessionaries should not
be discriminated or forced to pay different utilization
rates.
These substantive competition principles in the teleco-
mmunication sector were ratified, albeit in a simplified form,
by the Chilean ChRC12, which determined the conditions
for the long distance operations of concessionary carriers.
Following these guidelines:
11. S. LEVY and R. DEL VILLAR. Contribution of competition policy to
Economic Development: The case of Mexico, paper presented at
the OECD Competition Policy 1994 Workshop with the Dynamic
Non-Member Economics, OCDE/GD(96)59, Paris, 1996, p. 7.
12. Resolution 389 of 1993, on the guidelines for the operations of
telecommunications service suppliers.
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• Vertically integrated firms must preserve a separate legal
status, so that transfer costs and other aspects arising out
of their links are clearly identified; and
• Tariffs applied to accessing carriers will be non-
discriminatory, and will be determined by the authority
according to direct costs, in order to eliminate cross-
subsidies between long distance operations and local
ones.
These guidelines appear in most telecommunication laws
recently introduced in Latin America.
In Venezuela, for example, the Comision Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (Conatel) asked the advice of
ProCompetencia in preparing the Telecommunications Bill,
which has recently been passed by Congress. The new
legislation defines the functions of both entities concerning
cases involving anticompetitive behavior in this sector. In
this case, the competition agency retains its full involvement
to prosecute restrictive behavior in this sector. In particular,
ProCompetencia is in charge of deciding whether access to
network infrastructure has been blocked by the incumbent
firm, whether tariffs or other conditions set by the dominant
firm are abusive, whether merger operations restrict
competition, and whether firms engage in any other
restrictive undertaking, such as a cartel. In any of these events,
Conatel must supply the inputs necessary for facilitating the
work of ProCompetencia, and must decide the existence of
any wrongdoings on the basis of the opinion issued by
ProCompetencia.
Other countries engaged in the revision of the legal
framework regulating the telecommunications sector, such
as Costa Rica, have vested regulatory bodies with special
powers to investigate restrictive behavior, thus taking these
away from competition agencies.
D. Railway Networks
In Brazil, CADE was involved in the regulation of the national
railway system13. Before privatising the sector, the federal
railway system was divided in six parts and given to private
companies. CADE observed the need to restructure passenger
and cargo transportation using different criteria, which were
based on the specific market structure observed at each level.
Compared to cargo, the transportation of passengers is more
competitive, since there are other means of passenger
transportation available at the towns with access to the
railway network. Hence, both quality and prices are
conditioned by direct competition from other means of
ground transportation. Enhancing competition at this level
requires rebuilding or repairing public roads and other
transportation means. Private operators could also threaten
competition, since railways constitute a natural monopoly,
Since many private operators of the system also compete
with their customers and users, special conditions should
be imposed to prevent them from blocking their access on
the basis of the “essential facility doctrine”. As a report of
the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA) noted14, the
experience of CADE in this sector emphasized less of a concern
over the entry or exit of private railway operators. Rather, it
concentrated on regulating the conduct of the firms already
in the market in a manner aimed at maximizing social
welfare.
E. Seaport and Airport Facilities
In Mexico, the CFCM examined the privatization of the
Mexican port system. in particular, the commission was
involved at the stage of public offering and by designing the
conditions within which privatization would take place.
DURING 1995-96 the government granted several ports
operating rights to use their terminals and premises for the
handling of cargo, as well as three terminals for passenger
cruisers, and the administration of the ports of Acapulco and
Puerto Vallarta. In all these cases, the commission stressed
the need for preserving competitive conditions for operating
the service, and for preventing the imposition of artificial
entry barriers, the unfair displacement of competitors, and
setting monopolistic prices. Among the conditions examined
were the identification of the relevant market on each case,
and the concentration levels before privatisation15.
In Venezuela, ProCompetencia recently found that the
International Maiquetia Airport had abused its dominant
position in favouring the air carrier Avensa, at the expense
of its main competitor, Aeropostal, but decided to impose
no sanctions, as the airport voluntarily ceased to discri-
minate16. 16 Nevertheless, this case shows how competition
principles could ensure that fair access is given to companies
operating in airports.
13. See Cade, Annual Report 1997, Brazilia, 1997.
14. Sistema Económico Latinoamericano. Privatizaciones,
desregulación y competencia, un marco de análisis 12A a el estudio
de casos en América Latina y el Caribe, SP/RRPMR/DT n.º 2, Reunión
Regional sobre Privatización y Marcos Regulatorios, SELA-AECI,
Antigua, Guatemala, 22 y 23 de marzo de 1999.
15. Ibíd., p. 36.
16. Resolution SPPLC/053-99.
17. Resolution 048-98 and SPPLC/0 18-99.
18. Resolution SPPLC/032-99.
19. Articles 14 and 23, Law 19.542.Also, two further cases show how essential facilities, such
as ports, should be open to all operating companies on fair
terms. In recent decisions in the Venterninales and ANSAC
cases17, ProCompetencia granted the claims of abuse of
dominant position filed by Proquim, a local distributor of
dense soda ash against American Natural Soda Ash
Association (ANSAC). Proquim filed a complaint against ANSAC
for offering the company dense soda ash at prices
substantially higher than the sale price in Venezuela. Also,
it objected to the agreements ANSAC had with its Venezuelan
clients which contemplated the requirement of notifying
ANSAC of any better offers of dense soda ash received from
other suppliers. At the same time, Proquim had filed a claim
against Venterminales, the operator of a port where all the
dense soda ash consumed in Venezuela is discharged.
Venterminales was accused of charging Proquim
substantially higher prices for unloading dense soda ash
imported from Europe than the prices charged to ANSAC.
ProCompetencia ruled that ANSAC and Venterminales have
a dominant position, since ninety-eight percent of the dense
soda ash consumed in Venezuela comes from ANSAC and all
such product goes through the port of Venterminales.
Venterminales was found guilty of abusing its dominant
position since evidence was found showing that it had
charged substantially less to a competitor of Proquim who
was a subsidiary of ANSAC. Thus, there was no technical
reason for charging such high prices to Proquim for
disembarking its product imported from Europe. A fine
against of about US3.100,000 was imposed on Venter-
minales. ProCompetencia determined that ANSAC had also
abused its dominant position when it had refused to sell
dense soda ash to Proquim by charging prices substantially
higher than the sales price. ANSAC reached an agreement with
Proquirn under which it began selling Proquim , and
promised to modify its agreements with local purchasers.
Also, in the Puerto El Guamache case Procompetencia found
that the port-operating company Consorcio Guaritico had
abused its dominant position. The firm refused to renew a
contract to one of its operators, who was a competitor of
one of its subsidiary companies in providing disembarking
and storing services inside the port. Consorcio Guaritico
enjoyed a dominant position in the management of the port
as a result of a tender bidding process granted by the State
government18.
In Chile, according to the Ports Act19, the ChRC should lay
down general rules applying to port concessions and port
mono-operators. On the basis of this provision, the ChRC
issued a judgment laying down rules in order to avoid vertical
and horizontal integration. 20 These rules set out special
thresholds for the property of port operators for companies
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in other ports in the same geographical region to avoid
horizontal integration20.
F. Public Roads
Finally, in Panama CLICAC has actively advised the Panamanian
government in the design and implementation of A new
regulatory framework for the use of transportation and the
use of public roads. A text prepared for discussion by CLICAC,
examines the characteristics of the preliminary draft legislation
proposed as a regulatory framework for the Surface
Transportation Sector and the particular characteristics of this
industry in Panama. The aim is to evaluate whether the
preliminary draft legislation is a suitable instrument for
improving the economic efficiency of the sector, and to
propose the changes necessary to accomplish this objective21.
G. Water Supply Services
In 1997, Chile’s ChRC cleared the acquisition of a water
company (Agua Potable Lo Castillo, now Aguas Cordillera)
by Enersis, the dominant player in the electricity supply
market22. Despite the clearance, the Commission
recommended that the conglomeration of public utility
concessions should be subject to closer government
surveillance. As a result of this Resolution, the government
later passed the Sanitary Services Act, prohibiting water
companies from integrating with gas, electricity and/or local
telephone companies in the same concession area if they
serve more than half of the population in that area. Also,
this provision contains restrictions against horizontal
integration with other water companies.
VI. Conclusions
This new role has come a long way from the old rationale of
government economic regulation of sectors deemed to be
“natural monopolies”, such as electricity and telecommunica-
tions. In the past, it was thought that some operations of firms
operating in these sectors did not display increasing returns
to scale, and therefore, they should be regulated when only
one firm could enter in the market. Monopoly rights were
granted subject to the monitoring of regulated activities.
The evolution of technology is persuading scholars to
abandon their preconceptions about the existence of natural
monopoly, and the need of regulating them, in favor of a
goal-oriented regulatory perspective. From this new
perspective, policy makers concentrated their attention on
defining the tools that would achieve the regulatory goals.
These goals are now defined by the need to prevent
government failures in the provision of public goods, rather
than market failures. In this regard, GUASH and SPILLER
contend:
Historically, regulatory interventions were often
motivated by economic conditions no longer applicable,
or by political considerations and interest group pressures
to secure transfer of rents. Many sectors were viewed as
either natural monopolies or as being if vital social or
strategic interest, requiring significant regulation, if not
direct public ownership. These rationales in many sectors
are no longer considered valid. Changes in technology
and experience, and the more organized voice of
consumer groups, have called into question those
arguments. Regulatory reform is also driven by the
recognition that many existing regulations had become
obsolete and even harmful to economic growth. In
addition government failures may be as capable of
creating inefficiencies as market failures. As such, the
consequences of that type of regulation were an increase
in the cost of goods and services and an overall significant
welfare loss. As economies become more open, pressures
on countries to become more competitive drive the call
for regulatory reform to reduce costs and foster increased
productivity, competitiveness, and growth23.
Thus, the introduction of competition principles in the
regulation of utilities requires particular attention to the sort
of public intervention, in a way that transparency and less
discretion is ensured. Regulation today is based on technical
concepts and is far more transparent than the old “strategic”
reasons for subjecting the utilities to outright government
intervention. For instance, under the principles of
competition, governments should avoid any regulation that
distorts market functioning beyond natural “causes”. Thus,
it is acknowledged today that such regulation should not
introduce restrictions other than those unavoidable ones
stemming from the condition of “natural monopoly”, which
affects a given sector or parts of it. Hence, there should be
regulation (much less outright nationalization of assets) if
there are sub sectors or activities in which competition can
be monitored through conventional antitrust mechanisms.
Thus, under the new rationale, monopoly regulation should
be limited to utilities where “natural monopoly” conditions
apply. In this way, the new rationale for intervention clearly
excludes abstract considerations of “sovereignty” applicable
to sectors considered “strategic” in the past, such as the
exploitation of primary goods and minerals.
Regulation should ensure that an equilibrium is achieved
for preserving the fair standing of anyone interested in
entering the industry, without threatening it efficiency, which
would be lost when access is forced beyond the natural
capacity of the markets. In his opinion, such equilibrium













○a. It is necessary to select the proper choice of industry
structure. Policy makers should decide whether vertical
separation is preferable to competitive access. Also, they
should assess variables such as market size and density,
the extent of network development, and regulatory
capacity and design should affect the trade-off between
potential efficiency gains from competition compared
to the potential loss of co-ordination and scope of
economies from separation. Compared to the
conventional notion of “access” which is being used by
policy makers, the notion of connecting to “networks”
may provide a more accurate description of the dynamics
that encourages firms to seek connection for a firm that
enjoys a vertically integrated monopoly, or holds title
for operating a utility service or an infrastructure.
b. Policy makers should determine efficient pricing
policies. That includes how the uncertainties surrounding
the measurement of marginal cost, elasticity of demand
and other relevant economic parameters may affect the
appropriateness of different pricing strategies.
c. Definition of access pricing and interconnection
charges. This includes how high investment needs and
scarce information affect efficient rules for access to
bottleneck facilities such as the transmission grids for
generators, transmission pipelines for natural gas
producers, and track for rail service providers. Again,
the Baumol-Willig rule could be tested for determining
efficient market pricing.
d. Policy makers should consider redistribution issues,
and incorporate, whenever possible, neutral competitive
mechanisms for funding universal service. There are
several considerations to be made: how should political
and institutional endowments, fiscal conditions,
consumer incomes and preferences, and industry features
affect the design of support mechanisms to assist
consumers who would otherwise be disadvantaged by
lower income or remote location? Also, is it necessary
to consider which mechanisms would be better to
implement in order to achieve the desired redistribution
goals most efficiently: tax revenues, broadly-based tax
on sector industry revenues, cross-subsidized prices, etc?
Finally, policy makers should determine the appropriate
extent of subsidies, their sequence and delivery, in such
a way as to minimize any distortions on competition.
The experience of many Latin American countries shows
that the new status quo between government and individuals
is not always easy to establish. Frequently, legislation retains
too high levels of government involvement in running the
sector, following political objectives rather than economic
ones. Therefore, utility regulation still presents problems of
definition of prices for the supply of the service for
redistribution purposes and stimulates cross-subsidization,
to the detriment of efficiency at each level of production.
However, at times, privatization is done without the
necessary regulatory warrants necessary to preserve
consumer rights from unjustified price increases or quality
deterioration of the service supply.
In regards to high tech industries, similar problems arise.
The regulatory design must ensure that the rights of potential
entrants in the industry are not lessened by the creation of
entry barriers from incumbent firms, who may enjoy legal
monopolies created by intellectual property rights. The lack
of an optimal presence of competitors (potential or actual)
may encourage incumbent firms to display market power.
Adequate regulation should strike a delicate balance between
the interests of consumers in keeping price increases at bay
while preserving the economic incentives for investing firms
to remain in the sector.
The preservation of competition often entails is sues
embracing problems beyond the traditional problem of
dominance. One can see that the new trend of legislation in
this area incorporates initiatives of regulatory reform that
encompass a wide range of issues, as they emphasize the
general picture rather than viewing concentration as an
isolated problem. Much emphasis is placed, for instance,
on the need to preserve the rights of all those involved,
namely, consumers, producers, and the State.
The need to preserve an adequate equilibrium has apparently
settled on the creation of independent, technical
commissions integrated by members appointed for fixed
periods, where the interests of the groups involved in the
supply and demand of the service, namely consumers,
governments, and electrical operators, are properly
represented.
In sum, efficient regulation should ensure that technology
does not become a barrier to the entry of potential
competitors in the market. For this purpose, it necessary to
keep such barriers as low as possible, by making information
concerning performance standards public and readily
available to anyone interested. con texto
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20. Administrative opinion 1045.
21. “The Surface Transportation Sector and the Effect of the
Preliminary Draft Legislation: Economic Analysis and Recommended
Measures”, in Annual Report 1998, CLICAC, Panama, 1998.
22. Resolution 494/97.
23. LUIS GUASH and P. SPILLER. Managing the Regulatory Process:
Designs, Concepts, Issues and the Latin America and Caribbean
Story (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998), p. 1.